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OpinionGlossary
Altruism: a behavior that increases the fitness of another individual but
decreases the fitness of the actor.
Behavior map: functional relation between the external and internal states of
an organism (collectively called the motivational states) and its behavior.
Conformist transmission: individual preference for adopting common cultural
traits by social learning.
Cooperation: a behavior that increases the fitness of another individual.
Cultural relatedness: measure of the tendency that a pair of interacting
individuals is more likely to carry identical cultural variants than is a pair of
individuals sampled at random from a population.
Cultural transmission: nongenetic transmission of information or of a trait
from one individual to another in a population.
Darwinian demon: hypothetical being with the power to decide exactly which
phenotype to express, but without any influence over the ensuing natural
selection.
Evolutionary stable strategy: a strategy which, if adopted by a population of
players, cannot be invaded by any alternative strategy that is initially rare.
Fitness: expected number of adult offspring produced by an individual.
Genetic relatedness: measure of the tendency that a pair of interacting
individuals is more likely to carry identical genetic variants (alleles) than is a
pair of individuals sampled at random from a population.
Helping: a behavior that increases the fitness of another individual.
Individual learning: psychological (cognitive) processes supporting the gen-
eration or the innovation of behaviors that were not transmitted genetically or
culturally.
Payoff: a reward for the action of an individual.
Proximate factors: explanations of a behavior referring to the motivational
state of an organism and the factors determining the ontogeny of the behavior
(genotype and experience).
Social learning: psychological (cognitive) processes supporting cultural
transmission of behaviors.Helping behaviors can be innate, learned by copying
others (cultural transmission) or individually learned
de novo. These three possibilities are often entangled
in debates on the evolution of helping in humans. Here
we discuss their similarities and differences, and argue
that evolutionary biologists underestimate the role of
individual learning in the expression of helping beha-
viors in humans.
Ontogeny of helping behaviors
Helping and cooperative behaviors, whereby individuals in
a population increase the fitness of or payoff to other
individuals, is widespread in the natural world, both across
taxa and at different levels of biological organization (see
Glossary for a definition of terms). Examples range from
interactions between genes in genomes to mutualism be-
tween species in ecological communities. Among this diver-
sity, one of the most impressive examples of cooperation
occurs in humans. At the heart of human sociality are
behaviors and actions in which one individual provides
help for another. These behaviors have fascinated scholars
for centuries [1–4], and a contemporary of Darwin, Augus-
tus Comte, introduced the term ‘altruism’ in an attempt to
capture their essence [5]. Comte’s work, which focused on
intentionality—whether an individual intends to do good
by an action—formed the foundation for the humanities’
interest in altruism. Ever since Darwin, however, biol-
ogists have cared more about the evolutionary outcome
of actions than what was intended, and William D. Hamil-
ton’s foundational analysis led to the distinction between
two types of helping behaviors [4,6,7]. First, a helper can
reduce its own fitness or payoff, but the act of helping is
rewarded by the prospect of immediate or future return
due to helping by another individual in the population.
Reciprocation is expected and the lifetime fitness of the
actor is increased. Second, helping can result in a net
reduction in the lifetime fitness to the helper. In this
case, helping is said to be altruistic sensu stricto [4,8,9]
Understanding the variation in the prevalence and
nature of helping behaviors in humans and other species
requires identifying all the factors causing their evolution,
as well as those determining their expression during the
lifetime of an individual [10]. That is, onemust be careful to
distinguish between ultimate and proximate causes of
behaviors. Ethologists tend to divide proximate causes into
two categories (e.g. [11–13]). There are motivations, whichCorresponding author: Lehmann, L. (lehmann@stanford.edu).
664 0169-5347/$ – see front matter  2008 Elsevierare the stimuli causing the expression of a behavior at a
given moment in time, and ontogeny, which refers to the
determinants of the behavior map; namely, the causes
defining the relationship between stimuli (e.g. hunger)
and the organism’s behavioral response (e.g. searching
for food) (see Figure I in Box 1). What then determines
whether an individual will produce a cooperative response
to a particular set of stimuli? In other words, what deter-
mines the behavior map of helping behaviors? An evol-
utionary biologist will often first consider that a helping
behavior might be genetically determined. However, an
emphasis on simple genetics can be misleading. Indeed,
behaviors can be transmitted not only genetically from
parent to offspring, but also culturally from one individual
to another in a population. Another factor determining the
behavior map of helping is therefore social learning, by
which an individual can copy or adopt the behavior of
another in a population [11,12]. Birds learn song dialects
from neighbors and chimpanzees the skills of ‘termiting’
with tools [11,12], and it is plausible that animals thatUltimate factors: explanations of a behavior referring to selection pressure and
other factors that cause the evolution of the behavior.
Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.tree.2008.07.012 Available online 23 October 2008
Box 1. Behavior map of helping behaviors
Ethologists often assume that the behavior of an organism can be
predicted from knowledge about a set of external stimuli and internal
states of the organism (e.g. [13,89]). Together these are called the set
of motivational states, and are proximate explanations of behavior.
To each set s of motivational states of an animal at a given moment in
time one can assign a behavioral response z. Mathematically, this is
expressed as
z ¼MðsÞ; [1]
whereM is the behavior map defining the relationship between s and z
(Ref. [13], Equation 1.1). This approach to behavior also encompasses
social behaviors, where the behavior map represents the action taken
by an organism at a givenmoment in time when interacting with other
individuals (e.g. Ref. [33] and references therein). For instance, Tit-for-
Tat can be represented by a behavior map in which the motivational
state s can be taken to be the move of the partner in the preceding
round (either C for cooperation or D for defection); then, M = C on the
first move and M(s) = s for subsequent moves (e.g. M[D] = D and
M[C] = C).
The behavior map M of an individual might be determined by its
genotype g and/or what it has learned, h, either through social
interactions or individual exploration (h can be thought of as the
learning history of the individual). This can be expressed as
M ¼ F ðg;hÞ; [2]
whereFdescribeshowthebehaviormapusedbyan individualat agiven
moment in time is determined by its genes and its learning history (see
Figure I for a complementary view), which provide a second type of
proximate explanationsof behaviors. For instance, thebehaviormap for
Tit-for-Tat canbedeterminedgenetically, culturally, learned individually
or some combination of these factors (Figure I).
The learning history h(e,li,ls) of an individual depends on e, the
history of the individual’s environment, its social learning rule, ls, and
its individual learning rule, li, used to obtain information from the
environment. Finally, the two learning rules used by an individual
during its lifetime when interacting with its environment are shaped
by the individual’s genotype, g, and some aspects of its environment,
e (i.e. ls[g,e] and li[g,e]; see Figure I).
Figure I. Figurative representation of the determinants of the behavior map as described in Box 1. (a) Generic representation. The genotype, g, and the environment, e,
of an individual determine its social and individual learning rules (ls and li). These, in interaction with the environment (depicted as e  ls and e  li in the figure),
determine the learning history, h, of the individual (i.e. its experience). The genotype can affect the behavior map, M. either directly or indirectly via the learning
dynamics. (b–d) Determinants of the behavior map Tit-for-tat as they are generally considered in models for the evolution of cooperation. (b) The behavior map is
entirely genetically determined (e.g. [25]). (c) The behavior map is socially learned and it is implicitly assumed that individuals can perform social learning (e.g. [43]);
that is, the evolution of the social learning rules ls and their genetic foundation are not explicitly considered but assumed implicitly (hence the dashed arrow for the
effects of the genotype on the social learning rule ls). (d) The behavior map is individually learned (e.g. [66]). Again, the evolution of the individual learning rules li are
not explicitly considered. In existing models, there is also no effect of the environment on the learning rules, but the learning history depends on the interaction between
the expression of the social and individual learning rules and the environment (e  ls and e  li in the figure).
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There is yet a third determinant of behavior maps, more
familiar to economists than biologists in the context of
helping: individual learning of cooperation [14,15]. Indi-
vidual learning of a behavior is the relatively permanent
change of an individual’s behavior during the lifetime ofthat organism, without copying or imitating others.
Animals might learn several things individually, from food
to mates to predators [11,12], and it is plausible that they
also learn individually to cooperate or defect. Genetic,
cultural transmission and individual learning of helping
behaviors are dynamical systems that are all likely to665
Box 2. Terms used in game theory
Bargaining game: a type of negotiation where there is an exchange
of offers between individuals who eventually come to an agreement
on the partitioning of a payoff.
Folk theorem of repeated games: result of game theory stipulating
that there are an infinite number of Nash equilibria in the iterated
prisoner’s dilemma game.
Game: any situation where the success of an individual’s choices
depends on the choices of other individuals.
Iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD): game where the prisoner’s
dilemma game is repeated several times. The interdependence of
actions between rounds of the game creates incentives to cooperate
that are absent in the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game.
Nash equilibrium: equilibrium of a game where no player can
increase its payoff by changing its strategy, while the other players
keep their strategy unchanged. Each evolutionary stable strategy is
a Nash equilibrium, but the converse is not true.
Preference: a notion from economics which assumes that indivi-
duals make choices between alternatives and have the possibility to
rank order these alternatives, based on the satisfaction, gratification,
enjoyment or utility they provide.
Prisoner’s dilemma game: a situation where players interact
anonymously, only once, and have the choice between two
behaviors: cooperate or defect. Independently of the choices of
others, the payoff to an individual is always lower when it
cooperates than when it defects.
Public goods game: special case of the prisoner’s dilemma game
where the choices between behavior involve the consumption or the
use of a resource common to all players.
Tit-for-Tat: famous strategy in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma
game. This strategy helps in the first round and thereafter adopts
the strategy of its partner from the previous round.
Ultimatum game: a situation where two players interact anon-
ymously and only once. The first player proposes how to divide a
sum of money between the two players, and the second player can
either accept or reject this proposal. If the second player rejects,
neither player receives anything. If the second player accepts, the
money is split according to the proposal.
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humans and some other species.Whereas these interlinked
processes are well recognized in the study of animal beha-
vior by biologists [12] and the surveys of human behavior by
economists [14,16], they seldom appear together in writings
on the evolution of human cooperation.We believe that, as a
result, several biases have crept into the literature.Our goal
here is to discuss the similarities and the differences be-
tween genetic, cultural transmission and individual learn-
ing of helping behaviors, and ask: which is likely to promote
the highest level of helping and is, therefore, the most
important for human cooperation?
Genetic transmission of helping behaviors
Evolutionary biologists typicallymodel the behaviormapof
both simple and complex helping strategies as genetically
determined (e.g. [4,17,18]). For example, theworker caste in
social insects and the provision of a public good, such as a
sharedproduct, inmicroorganismsare genetically inherited
phenotypes (e.g. [19,20]). The ultimate explanation for such
helping behaviors often centers on genetic relatedness be-
tween actor and recipient [4,8,17].When actor and recipient
are related, genetically determined altruistic helping can
evolvebecause thebenefitproducedbyahelper is likely tobe
received by another individual carrying the gene(s) causing
helping, instead of being received by an individual carrying
the gene(s) for less or no helping. One of the main questions
is then to understand how ecological, demographic and life-
history factors interact to generate an assortment between
individuals carrying genes for altruism. Many different
models have addressed this issue (e.g. [8,9,17,21–23]), and
ageneral conclusion fromthese is that for altruismtoevolve,
the group size of interacting individuals must not be too
large and/or the rate of migration not too high, otherwise
relatedness within groups becomes too small to sustain the
evolution of altruism. A genetically determined behavior
map is then a good candidate to explain the altruism found
within small-scale societies. Humans, however, have also
been documented to reduce their personal reproduction in
helping unrelated individuals (e.g. religious celibacy, kami-
kaze behavior), and in such cases other proximate determi-
nants of behaviors than genetic must be invoked to explain
such behaviors.
Not all helping behaviors, however, reduce personal
reproduction. When interactions occur between individuals
sampled at random from a population (i.e. a well-mixed
population with no relatedness between actor and recipi-
ent), a geneticallydeterminedhelping strategymight evolve
if it is rewarded by the prospect of immediate or future
cooperation by the partner. This observation led evolution-
ists tomodel the interactions between individuals as games
with repeated interactions [24,25], as had been done pre-
viously by economists (the so-called multistage and
repeated games [16,26–28]). The common underlying prin-
ciple in such games is that links between current and future
actions can create incentives to help that are not apparent if
single actions are considered in isolation. The emergence of
such incentives are often studied in the context of the
iterated prisoner’s dilemma game (IPD; Box 2), whose
analysis popularized the strategy Tit-for-Tat, which helps
in the first round and then adopts the strategy of its partner666from the previous round [15,25,29]. The outcome of the IPD
game, however, can be extremely difficult to predict because
there aremultiple solutions to it.More precisely, Tit-for-Tat
is neither an evolutionary stable strategy [30] nor a strict
Nashequilibrium,and there are in fact an infinitenumberof
Nash equilibria in the IPD, a result known as the ‘folk
theorem’ of repeated games [15,31,32]. This explains why
evolutionists have analyzed a bewildering number of differ-
ent models to assess which strategies perform better or
coexist in the IPD games and various other games (e.g.
[33–38]). These models show that genetically determined
responses to repeated interactions will often evolve to pro-
ducehelpingbehaviors.Evenso, thesemodels lack the social
learningobserved inhumans,and thishas led researchers to
consider a second mode of inheritance of helping traits:
cultural transmission.
Social learning of helping behaviors
The study of cultural evolution descends directly from
existing evolutionary theory [39], with the difference that
traits are assumed to be inherited culturally rather than
genetically. For instance, a public goods game can be
analyzed within an evolutionary setting by assuming cul-
tural rather than genetic determination of behavior maps.
But switching to cultural transmission does bring in
additional considerations. Whereas genetically deter-
mined behaviors tend to follow strict vertical transmission
Box 3. Debate: does cultural transmission promote
altruism?
Here we describe the conditions under which cultural transmission
leads to a higher level of altruism than under genetic transmission
in evolutionary models. Suppose the population is of infinite size
and that a strictly one-shot interaction occurs between randomly
matched pairs of individuals that can express only two different
behaviors: altruist, which results in a fitness cost c to the actor and a
fitness benefit b to the receptor, and defector, which causes the
actor to take the benefits of helping at no cost. Under genetic
transmission with the two behaviors transmitted vertically from
parents to offspring, a population consisting entirely of altruists is
invaded by defection, which is the classic finding associated with
the prisoner’s dilemma game. Now suppose we add in a second
round of transmission, which is cultural and whereby each
individual after pairing adopts the behavior of one of the two that
is randomly drawn in the pair (i.e. one-to-many horizontal
transmission), with the consequence that both individuals in the
pair now carry the behavior. Because such a rule causes perfect
assortment of altruists and defectors, altruism can invade a
population of defectors. If such a social learning rule exists, the
evolution of altruism is more likely under cultural than under pure
genetic transmission of the behavior. However, the problem is only
half solved because one is now faced with another and equally
important question: can such a learning rule evolve when the
population is initially fixed for vertical transmission only?
The answer depends on multiple factors. One can show that a
genetically determined learning rule in a simple model can indeed
evolve, and be stable upon fixation, provided the group of randomly
matched individuals is small—such as the pair in our example—and
that the learning rule is not itself costly [61]. However, this finding
relies on excluding strategies from the model framework that can
cause assortment to fail. Indeed, individuals are assumed to be able
to copy helping behaviors (from individuals in the same or previous
generations), but also that they do not use the information gathered
on the cooperative tendency in their social neighborhood to exploit
others. This strong assumption is a common denominator of all
current models assuming the cultural transmission of altruism and
cooperation (e.g. [44,45,54]). Much work remains to be done to
establish the conditions under which cultural transmission would
evolve (or be stable) in such a way as to tip the balance in favor of
helping in situations under which genetic transmission of behavior
maps favors defection.
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occur obliquely from various adults to individuals of the
offspring generation, or horizontally between individuals
of the same generation [40–42]. For instance, individuals
might copy a helping strategy from their grandparents, or
from unrelated members of present and past generations.
Another important consideration is what drives the differ-
ential proliferation of cultural traits: differential success
can result from effects of cultural traits on darwinian
(reproductive) fitness [40,43] or, alternatively, from their
effects on some other payoff such as wealth or prestige. In
the latter case, the dynamics of helping are often assumed
to be mediated by individuals copying the strategies of
individuals with the highest payoffs (e.g. [43–46]). But does
the change from genetic to cultural transmission of helping
behaviors produce different evolutionary dynamics of these
traits?
When interactions occur among individuals drawn at
random from a population, the dynamics of helping strat-
egies under both genetic and cultural transmission often
lead to identical outcomes. This similarity occurs in spite of
the differences between genetic and cultural transmission
rules. A rich variety of more or less sophisticated trans-
mission rules have been explored under social learning
(e.g. ‘best-response dynamics’ or ‘fictitious play’ [43,47,48]
and references therein), but, because identical behaviors
lead to identical payoff values, there are similar selective
pressures for genetically and culturally transmitted traits.
As a result, economists often adopt the classical equations
from population genetics to describe the evolutionary
dynamics of various strategies (e.g. [49–51]), and many
of the genetic models for repeated interactions discussed in
the previous section are presented as being equally valid
for cultural transmission (e.g. [52]).
Although for numerous games many dynamics indeed
lead to the same predictions under both genetic and cul-
tural transmission [53], there are properties of cultural
transmission thatmight cause these predictions to diverge.
For example, under cultural transmission it might be
difficult to observe and copy all the fine details of a com-
plicated strategy, especially because only actions can be
observed and not the behavior map of a strategy. It
remains to investigate whether such factors will increase
or decrease the equilibrium level of cooperation for a given
game. Nevertheless, there is one difference between cul-
tural and genetic transmission of helping that has received
considerable attention, because it might allow culturally
transmitted altruistic helping to evolve where genetic
altruism cannot. This distinctive feature is that cultural
transmission allows helping behaviors to be easily trans-
mitted among genetically unrelated individuals. Whereas
under genetic transmission it is the ecological, demo-
graphic and life-history factors that determine the genetic
relatedness between interacting individuals, under cul-
tural transmission the cultural relatedness between inter-
acting individuals is determined by how individuals
assimilate cultural variants from other individuals in
the population. Nonvertical transmission can then hom-
ogenize behavior within groups, leading to high cultural
relatedness within groups lacking high levels of genetic
relatedness [40,54,55]. Cultural transmission might there-foremarkedly increase the chance that helpers or defectors
occur together in a group relative to that expected under
genetic transmission. Specifically, it has been argued that
humans have a predisposition for conformism—the copy-
ing of the majority strategy—which naturally leads to
groups where individuals all perform the same strategy
[46,54,56,57].
The observation that cultural transmission can increase
the assortment between identical strategies has led to two
complementary views: first, that cultural transmission is
central to the observed levels of altruistic helping in
humans and, second, that biased conformism is the main
transmission rule underlying such altruism (e.g.
[46,54,57–59] and references therein). These conclusions,
however, require caveats. The two predictions that cultural
transmission enhances the selection pressure on altruism
and that conformist transmission is the kernel of the
process are based on a specific set of assumptions, which,
if violated, can produce the opposite results [60,61]. It is
premature, therefore, to argue that cultural transmission
is the key to human helping behaviors. This requires a
far better understanding of the conditions under which667
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evolution of altruistic helping (Box 3).
Individual learning of helping behaviors
The discussion so far has emphasized the differences be-
tween the transmission processes of genetically and cultu-
rally encoded behavior maps. It is then the differences in
the proliferation of helping strategies from one time span
to the next that determine the equilibrium distribution of
strategies played by the individuals in the population.
However, not all human game-playing strategies are deter-
mined only by genetic or cultural transmission; humans
can also select a behavior individually, through trial and
error, insight or deduction [16]. Here it is not a specific
behavior map that is inherited genetically or culturally by
an individual but a payoff-based choice-determining rule
by which it can modify its behavior map(s) throughout its
lifetime by individual exploration (see Figure I in Box 1).
The study of individual learning rules has a long history
in economics, psychology and biology (e.g. [13,62–65]), and
two nonmutually exclusive classes of strategies can be
recognized. The first is exemplified by reinforcement learn-
ing, where the probability of playing a particular strategy
is adjusted over time in response to the current payoff. This
allows an individual to select a strategy for a game without
ever observing or knowing anything about other individ-
uals (e.g. [66]). This learning by doing is referred to as the
‘evolutive’ approach to the individual behavioral choice
problem in the economics literature [32,67,68] probably
because, as in evolutionary settings, there is a dynamical
process of selection by which themost rewarding strategies
succeed over those that are less rewarding (e.g. [66,69]).
This approach envisages individuals as simple stimulus–
responsemachines who can select a strategy among a set of
alternatives in the absence of a complete understanding of
the underlying game structure (hence the term ‘bounded
rationality’ of the economics literature). Here, Tit-for-Tat
will be played in the IPD game if it is reinforced over time
by a consistently higher payoff than alternative strategies
experienced by the actor [66,69].
The second class of payoff-based choice-determining
rules relies on individuals having detailed knowledge of
the game they are in and using reasoning to find their way
toward one of the equilibria of the game. That is, individ-
uals perceive the situation and the consequence of their
actions and those of others as a whole, and deduce a
response for these. In the economics literature, this is
the so-called deductive or eductive approach to the beha-
vioral selection problem [32,67,68]. The incarnation of such
learning by reasoning is the ‘rational man’ idealization, a
machine with unbounded powers of computation and cogi-
tation [70] which has the ability to simulate its partner
simulating its own behavior, to be able to predict what the
partner will play (nothing prevents the rational man ideal-
ization from using social information). Under the deductive
approach to behavioral selection (learning by reasoning),
individuals are assumed to select a strategy because it
corresponds to a Nash equilibrium of the game they play—
or some related concept of it—and economists dispute
which is the correct equilibrium concept to use
[32,67,68,71]. In other words, the strategy Tit-for-Tat668would be played in the IPD game in this context not
because of selection caused by genetic, cultural or beha-
vioral reinforcement dynamics but because individuals
deduce that playing Tit-for-Tat is a best response in a
population of Tit-for-Tat players.
As for social learning, the predicted dynamics of
cooperation under individual learning can show significant
overlap with those under genetic transmission. In particu-
lar, if a learning rule is evolutionarily stable, it follows that
it should allow individuals to find the evolutionary stable
strategy of the game played under genetic transmission of
the behaviors [62,72], provided there is such an evolution-
ary stable strategy. Therefore, all else being equal, the
equilibrium level of cooperation under individual learning
is predicted to be the same as that under genetic trans-
mission. That said, few models have addressed the evol-
ution of individual learning rules for social interactions
[65] and, to our knowledge, no study has directly compared
the propensity for individual learning to promote coopera-
tion relative to that under social learning or genetic trans-
mission of behavior maps. Such comparisons might prove
to be useful. Because a behavior selected by individual
learning is not inherited from one generation to the next (in
the absence of social learning), such a choice-determining
rule has no advantage over genetic transmission in con-
stant environments. But individual learning has the poten-
tial to allow individuals to adapt to rapidly changing
environments (e.g. [42,63,72,73]). That is, individual learn-
ing allows a much closer tracking of fluctuations in the
environment (whether social and nonsocial environments)
than does genetic inheritance. Because humans have
evolved under conditions of fluctuating environments
and have strong dispositions for individual learning [74],
they might arguably also be able to easily modify their
social behaviors. But is there any empirical evidence that
humans can learn to find an equilibrium of a game they
play?
Individual learning of helping in humans
Many data have been collected on the behavior of humans
in economic games, in which researchers bring subjects
into the laboratory, explain a set of rules and let the
subjects play for monetary rewards. If the problem faced
by the subjects is not too complex, and subjects have ad-
equate incentives and ample time to learn, convergence of
behavior to the equilibria of games by individuals has been
repeatedly documented whenever the game has a single
Nash equilibrium [15,75]. For instance, in the public goods
game, whose only equilibrium is to contribute nothing, 90%
of subjects end up playing this strategy after several
iterations of the game [76,77]. In bargaining games, which
are close to real-life trading situations, humans are also
able to find the theoretical equilibrium [75]. These results
have then been interpreted in the light of individual learn-
ing [15,75]. However, alternative explanations for the
public goods game results based on fixed strategies can
be proposed (S. Gaechter, pers. commun.), and there are
also instances where behavior deviates from theoretical
expectations. For instance, in public goods games, where a
focal individual learns to play a Nash equilibrium, remov-
ing the individuals that she learned with and replacing
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revert to play a non-Nash equilibrium [78]. Furthermore,
in bargaining games, there is a general tendency to refuse
inequitable offers [75], a tendency further exaggerated in
the ultimatum game, where humans adjust very little
through learning and continuously play more fairly than
expected [15,79]. These contrasting examples paint a
vague picture of how individual learning affects human
helping. It remains unclear why subjects play the way they
do, and a lot of attention has been paid to those games in
which humans play more fairly than expected.
The observation of a much fairer contribution than
expected in a subset of experimental games has been
explained in the light of two different conceptions of the
nature of human helping. One perspective envisions indi-
viduals as expressing relatively fixed ‘other-regarding’
preferences, valuing cooperation, fairness and retribution
(e.g. [79–81]). This conception follows from the observation
of a behavioral regularity in experimental games that has
been called strong reciprocity, a predisposition to cooperate
with others and punish non-cooperators (at a cost to the
punisher), even if the punishment will never increase the
lifetime fitness of the punisher [79,82]. The second
perspective views individuals as ‘self-regarding’ decision
makers who aim to maximize their own monetary rewards
(or material payoffs) and can find their way toward a
maximum reward by learning [15,16]. The fair contri-
bution from experimental games is then explained by
invoking a learning processwith two behavioral time steps.
In the first time step, the frame of the experiment (i.e.
external stimuli) triggers the expression of a genetically or
culturally encoded social norm from a real-life game, which
involves, for instance, helping a family or a group member
[83]. In a second time step, when the same game is
repeated several times with different partners, individual
learningmight occur. Individual learning is predicted to be
very slow in games that are characterized by multiple
Nash equilibria [15]. The ultimatum game has an infinite
number of such equilibria, only one of which—contributing
nothing—is stable in the ultra long run [84]. The social
norm triggered initially is thus expected to dominate for a
very long time before the learning dynamic finds the long-
run equilibrium of the game [84]. These two different
proximate explanations for a fair contribution in exper-
imental games illustrates again that the underpinning of
behavior maps used by subjects in experiments remains
unclear and is much debated, not to mention the effect of
the internal states of individuals such as serotonin level
[85].
As demonstrated above, debates over the nature of
human helping often focus on whether people display
other-regarding or self-regarding preferences (e.g. [79–
81]). This distinction, however, is based upon the obser-
vation of behavioral preferences rather than their expla-
nation (the ‘revealed preference’ principle), which means
that it does not translate directly into an evolutionary
accounting. Observed preferences—other-regarding or
otherwise—depend on how behavior maps transform
stimuli into behavioral responses, and the mappings that
persist in the long run are those that increase the fre-
quency in the population of the genetic or the culturalvariants causing them [86]. Moreover, both other-regard-
ing and self-regarding preferences are likely to frequently
involve direct benefits to the individuals that display them
once all lifetime behavioral feedbacks from their expres-
sion have been taken into account, that is, ‘other-regarding’
does not map onto altruism defined in the strict evolution-
ary sense (i.e. Hamilton’s altruism). Where the two
perspectives differ, however, is in their relative emphasis
on inherited versus individually learned mappings: the
literature on other-regarding preferences tends to treat
individuals as irreversibly committed by genetic or cul-
tural helping variants to express a fixed pattern of beha-
viors. The self-regarding literature, by contrast, suggests a
highly plastic behavior map, which can be continually
adjusted in a way that yields the actors the highest payoff
in each new game [15], probably the closest we can get to a
darwinian demon [87]. Rather than focusing on other- or
self-regarding preferences of individuals, therefore, we
believe that the debate over the nature of human helping
would be more usefully focused on the effects and relative
importance of behavioral plasticity, whether socially or
individually learned.
Conclusion
Behavior maps, by which an organism translates external
stimuli and internal states into action, can be genetically
determined, cultural transmitted, individually learned or
some combination of these factors. Understanding the
structure and evolution of the behavior maps underlying
human cooperation and altruism remains a daunting chal-
lenge. Today, few will doubt the importance of genetic
influence on human behavior. Nevertheless, it remains
plausible that the human capacity to learn and personal
experience aremore central to the ontogeny of helping than
direct genetic effects on behavior maps (see Figure I in Box
1). This is consistent with the growing body of theory on
social learning of helping behaviors, which identifies con-
ditions under which altruism can evolve in groups of large
size where individuals engage in cultural transmission
(e.g. [57,88]). However, the same theory can be used to
find conditions under which cultural transmission inhibits
altruism, and we must not be too quick to assume that
cultural transmission promotes helping (Box 3). Further-
more, the literature on social learning of cooperation tends
to give short shrift to learning by doing or by reasoning,
processes that allow a much faster response to changing
environmental conditions than geneticmutation and social
learning. The role of individual learning is thus likely to
have been of equal importance to that of social learning in
the expression of cooperation throughout human history.
The nature of this role remains to be elucidated, as does the
question of whether individual learning promotes or inhi-
bits the evolution of cooperation. As for social learning,
more empirical and theoretical work are required to better
understand the effects of individual learning of helping
behavior and its interaction with cultural transmission.
The difficulty of the problem is compounded by the fact that
learning individuals might not only adapt to a particular
game defined by prevailing environmental conditions but
might also change or design the rules of the game they play
(i.e. evolution of games of mechanism design [28,48]). This669
Opinion Trends in Ecology and Evolution Vol.23 No.12raises the intriguing question of how often and how early
humanswere able to shape the game of life in such away as
to promote the expression of more cooperative solutions.
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